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Comment Jason Furman
John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes make an important analytic con-
tribution to our understanding of the diﬀerence between deﬁned beneﬁt
and deﬁned contribution systems. But Geanakoplos and Zeldes’ goal is not
simply to make an analytic contribution but to forge a potential compro-
mise between Republican supporters of individual accounts and Demo-
cratic opponents of them. As such, it is important to judge this chapter on
whether it should—or would—form the basis of a future compromise.
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Editors’ note: This comment was prepared by Jason Furman based on the version of the
paper presented at the conference in October 2006 when Jason Furman was a Senior Fellow
at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities. Due to his move to the White House National
Economic Council in January 2009, Dr. Furman was unable to edit this comment to reﬂect
the revisions undertaken by the authors in response to his comments. The editors have noted
those places in the comment where Geanakoplos and Zeldes have revised their paper to ad-
dress the concerns raised in this comment. The views expressed in this comment do not rep-
resent the views of SSA, any agency of the federal government, or of the NBER.The Analytic Contribution
Geanakoplos and Zeldes’ principal analytic contribution is to develop a
general framework that makes it possible to express a deﬁned beneﬁt sys-
tem in deﬁned contribution terms. They develop a new set of securities, a
mandatory savings rule, and a system of matching contributions that make
it possible to use individual accounts to reproduce Social Security retire-
ment beneﬁts, including risk-sharing across generations and redistribution
based on lifetime income. (The authors do not reproduce survivors or aux-
iliary beneﬁts.)
Speciﬁcally, each year a person would be required to use 10.6 percent of
his income (the amount that currently funds Old-Age and Survivors In-
surance) to purchase a new type of security called a personal annuitized av-
erage wage security or PAAW. A PAAW initially pays the economy-wide
wage in the year of retirement and then pays the same amount indexed for
inﬂation every year until the death of the original recipient. This security
matches two features of Social Security that are generally absent in deﬁned
contribution plans: a security whose payoﬀ is linked to productivity and a
real annuity.
Geanakoplos and Zeldes reproduce Social Security’s lifetime redistribu-
tion by specifying a matching rule that can be positive or negative and
would specify the number of PAAWs a person can buy per $1 of manda-
tory saving. The Geanokplos-Zeldes matching rule exploits the fact that
the lifetime Social Security beneﬁt formula can be rewritten as a the sum
of a series of nonnegative functions of income received to date:
f(w1, w2, w3, . . . , wT)  ∑
T
t 1
g(w1, . . . , wT) where g( )   0
As a result, specifying the appropriate matching rule is simply coming up
with a function g that speciﬁes the amount of PAAWs a worker receives as
a function of their income earned to date. And the particular function is
based on the additional retirement beneﬁts a worker would get if he never
worked again.1 Speciﬁcally, worker i gets awarded PAAWs at time t that
correspond to the three primary insurance amount (PIA) formula factors
in the Social Security system, 0.90, 0.32, and 0.15. The amount of PAAWs
you get thus shifts as your earnings to date, averaged over thirty-ﬁve years,
move you through these three factors:
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1. Editors’ note: There are a variety of possible choices of the function g, each of which rep-
resent a diﬀerent method for accruing beneﬁts. Geanakoplos and Zeldes examine two: one
that they call the “fastest” method and another that they call the “straight-line” method. Only
the ﬁrst of these methods was included in the original conference version of this paper, so Fur-
man’s comment focuses on this one. This fastest accrual method computes the beneﬁts a
worker would receive under the current system based on earnings to date, assuming that he
never worked again. The incremental PAAWs awarded each year are chosen to replicate the
incremental accrued beneﬁts in that year.Get 0.9 ∗    until Bend 1
Get 0.32 ∗    until Bend 2
Get 0.15 ∗    until maximum
Get 0 thereafter
Having recast Social Security retirement beneﬁts in terms of securities
(which match the intergenerational risk sharing) and a matching rule
(which matches the intragenerational redistribution), makes several help-
ful substantive points and provides the basis for moving forward analyti-
cally.
First, it shows that the essential diﬀerence between a deﬁned beneﬁt and
a deﬁned contribution plan is not the intergenerational risk-sharing, the in-
tergenerational redistribution, or the intragenerational redistribution. You
can have as much or as little of these features as you want either type of plan.
This is the ﬁrst step toward focusing the debate about accounts on some of
the other genuine distinctions, many of them discussed in the following.
Second, recasting the existing Social Security system in terms of ﬁnan-
cial securities is a ﬁrst step toward using alternative methods to analyze So-
cial Security’s current situation. For example, the Social Security Admin-
istration’s Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary calculates the “maximum transition
cost,” which is the value of Social Security beneﬁts incurred for work to
date net of the balance in the trust fund. The actuaries estimated that this
totaled $13.5 trillion as of the beginning of 2004. Geanakoplos and Zeldes
provide an alternative framework for estimating the maximum transition
cost by valuing the ﬁnancial securities that are equivalent to the beneﬁt
promise. In their chapter, they just do this in the risk neutral case, which is
equivalent to the actuaries’ procedure. But in forthcoming work, they plan
to extend these results to the case with risk aversion.
Finally, the Geanakoplos-Zeldes framework can ﬂexibly be extended to
examine other issues, like how to achieve robust solvency that ensures not
just that Social Security is in long-run balance but also that it can stay in
long-run when subjected to various shocks. The Geanakoplos-Zeldes
chapter oﬀers one version of a plan that would adjust the matching for-
mula to ensure that the value of PAAWs that were distributed in any given
year was equal to the payroll taxes collected in that year. Hopefully in fu-
ture work Geanakoplos-Zeldes will be able to use some of the analytic ma-
chinery they develop to perform a welfare analysis of this approach as
compared to alternative ways of achieving robust solvency.
wi,t  
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Helping us understand Social Security reform better is not the same as
providing the basis for an actual Social Security plan. And in this regard, I
am more skeptical. Geanakoplos-Zeldes appears to lose many of the po-
tential beneﬁts of accounts and in some cases even turn the virtues of ac-
counts into vices.
The Geanakoplos-Zeldes plan has two distinct parts. The ﬁrst part is a
structure for the accounts. The second part is a mechanism for restoring
balance. In eﬀect, these two parts are separable—the account structure is
compatible with alternative methods of achieving solvency, and their sol-
vency proposal could be implemented without accounts or with more tra-
ditional accounts. The accounts proposal is more novel, and thus it is what
I concentrate my comments on.
Accounts have several claimed advantages. Without passing judgment
on whether these advantages are real or quantitatively important, how
does the Geanakoplos-Zeldes plan do on them?
Reduced Labor-Leisure Distortions
One potential beneﬁt of accounts is that by tying beneﬁts more closely
to contributions, they reduce labor-leisure distortions (the ﬂip side of re-
duced redistribution). The Geanakoplos-Zeldes accounts, by design, re-
produce all of the redistribution associated with the current system and,
thus, all the distortions as well.
Diversiﬁcation for Constrained Households
A second potential beneﬁt of accounts is that they can help achieve di-
versiﬁcation for households that are equity constrained due to liquidity
constraints or the inability to use future Social Security beneﬁts as collat-
eral. The core Geanakoplos-Zeldes proposal to securitize Social Security
beneﬁts through PAAWs does nothing to change this situation because
these beneﬁts mimic traditional Social Security. The proposal to require
people to sell 10 percent of their PAAWs to purchase traditional securities
would achieve this goal, although this part of the plan is logically unrelated
to the broader structure.
Improved Political Economy of Prefunding
Another potential beneﬁt of accounts is that contributions would count 
as a reduction in the uniﬁed deﬁcit, making it more likely that non-Social 
Security ﬁscal policies will not oﬀset any prefunding in Social Security. The
Geanakoplos-Zeldes plan might share this beneﬁt with other accounts
plans, although the extent could be minimized because the optics and bud-
getary accounting treatment of individual-speciﬁc securities like PAAWs
might diﬀer from more conventional securities. Moreover, the Geanakoplos-
Zeldes plan, by design, does not actually have any prefunding.
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Another potential beneﬁt of accounts is that they can have greater trans-
parency in terms of the link between contributions and beneﬁts and the
underlying ﬁnancial status of the system. The Geanakoplos-Zeldes plan
would have the advantage of providing a market estimate of the maximum
transition cost, a number that is currently calculated by the actuaries.
However, estimating conventional solvency criteria would still require pro-
jections about the evolution of matching rates and would not be reﬂected
in a market price.
This gain for system transparency comes at a large cost in terms of re-
duced transparency for individual beneﬁciaries. There are serious optical
issues and apparent cliﬀs in the formula. Some of these optical problems
should not be held against the plan because they are simply making fea-
tures of the current system more transparent, for example, the fact that the
typical sixty-three-year-old will get zero PAAWs for his payroll contribu-
tion reﬂects the fact that a typical sixty-three-year-old today does not in-
cur any additional beneﬁts from his work.
More serious, however, is that the Geanakoplos-Zeldes plan introduces
cliﬀs and sends misleading signals about marginal tax rates in a manner
that does not correspond to today’s Social Security system.2 It might be
hard to explain why a worker in the ﬁrst year of a $500,000-a-year job will
get a better matching rate than a worker in the thirtieth year of a $50,000-
a-year job. There is some risk that labor-leisure decisions would be dis-
torted by the signals the system sent. For example, an average earner at age
thirty-two would get 100 PAAWs for each $1 contributed to the account
(renormalizing the units). The following year, however, he would move into
the new bracket and get only thirty-nine PAAWs for each $1 contributed to
the account. This would appear to be a large increase in the marginal tax
rate. In fact, it is just an artifact of the beneﬁt calculation. The marginal
rate on earnings at age thirty-two and age thirty-three—assuming the per-
son plans to continue working until age sixty-ﬁve—are essentially the
same. The problem arises because the apparent marginal rate in the
Geanakoplos-Zeldes rule is correct only for someone who plans to never
work again after that year, which, for the vast majority of workers, is the
wrong thought experiment.
Figure 3C.1 generalizes this point. It shows the true marginal tax rates
for a scaled medium earner who will work until age sixty-four. These are
10.6 percent initially (because the early years of work will be dropped from
the beneﬁt calculation) and then gradually fall, become negative, and then
rise back up to 10.6 percent in the years before retirement. In contrast, the
perceived marginal rates in the Geanakoplos-Zeldes plan (or the true mar-
ginal rates for someone deciding whether to continue working) follow a
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2. Editors’ note: This comment applies only to the “fastest accrual method,” which was the
method presented in the original conference version of the paper.very diﬀerent pattern. In fact, a naive person who considers the 5.3 percent
employee share of the tax as their marginal rate will, in a mean-squared de-
viation sense, be closer to correct than someone who follows the matching
rates under this proposal.3
Enhanced Ownership
The principal beneﬁt of shifting from our current system to this form of
accounts is, according to Geanakoplos and Zeldes, that it would replace
Social Security’s uncertain promise with a system with “irrevocable own-
ership of market priced assets.” Set aside the question of whether this is a
desirable goal—arguably with signiﬁcant long-run ﬁscal challenges and
uncertainty, you might not want policymakers to preserve the ﬂexibility to
adjust on a variety of other margins. Set aside also the observation that this
goal could be achieved in other ways, for example, by enacting a constitu-
tional amendment guaranteeing workers a legal property right in their ac-
crued beneﬁts.
The bigger question about this proposal, and virtually all accounts pro-
posals, is would it achieve the stated goal of strengthening the ownership of
beneﬁts and reducing political risk? The answer is no—at least not any bet-
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Fig. 3C.1 Marginal tax rates by age (scaled medium earner)
3. Editors’ note: In the ﬁnal version of their paper, Geanakoplos and Zeldes introduced the
straight-line accrual method in order to address the problem that Jason Furman raised in his
original critique above.ter than the current system. Policymakers could directly “cut” beneﬁts by
imposing a tax on account withdrawals, perhaps rationalized as a recapture
of the tax beneﬁts associated with the accounts. While it is hard to imagine
that it would be politically feasible to impose this retroactively on current
retirees, it is equally hard to imagine a politically feasible beneﬁt cut on cur-
rent retirees. More politically feasible would be to impose a tax on account
accumulations, eﬀectively equivalent to phasing in a beneﬁt reduction in the
current system. Finally, policymakers could change the matching rule—in
the extreme case letting a thirty-ﬁve-year-old worker keep all of his PAAWs
but not granting him or her any new ones. This would be tantamount to a
beneﬁt cut of more than 50 percent. The political economy of these mea-
sures does not seem to diﬀer materially from the political economy of cut-
ting entitlements under the existing system: as indeed you would expect if
people, or at least interest groups like the American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP), are remotely rational.
Even if accounts succeeded in establishing a ﬁrmer property right with
less political risk than current beneﬁts, this eﬀect would simply be undone
elsewhere in the system. For example, if there was a large unforeseen shock,
then the inability to alter Social Security beneﬁts would result in larger ad-
justments in Medicare beneﬁts. As long as any part of the ﬁscal system is
discretionary, then it is impossible to lock in any pattern of inter- or intra-
generational redistribution simply by removing discretion from one part of
the system—the remainder of the system will just pick up the residual
changes.
Downsides of Accounts
Finally, Geanakoplos and Zeldes avoid many of the downsides of ac-
counts. But their speciﬁc proposal suﬀers rather acutely from very large ad-
ministrative costs relative to the size of accounts. The marketable portion of
their accounts is less than 1 percent of payroll, generally considered well be-
low the minimally acceptable level. Moreover, the complicated individual-
speciﬁc securities they create would themselves require substantially
higher transactions cost than more traditional securities as owners of the
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Table 3C.1 Alternative views on Social Security
Democrats Republicans
Prefer more redistribution within lifetime  Prefer less redistribution within lifetime (i.e.,
(i.e., higher taxes and replacement rates) lower taxes and replacement rates)
Prefer more progressivity on the tax side  Prefer more progressivity on the beneﬁt side 
(e.g., raise the taxable maximum) (e.g., means testing or progressive price 
indexing)
Hate anything called “accounts” Love anything called “accounts”bundles would need a mechanism to track the retirement and death of each
of the many thousands of people named on the speciﬁc PAAWs.
Would Geanakoplos-Zeldes Form the Basis of a Future Compromise?
Finally, I end with a purely positive question: would I predict that
Geanakoplos-Zeldes ultimately forms the basis of a future compromise. In
a well-run world, the answer to this question would follow directly from the
normative questions asked in the preceding. In the actual world, the an-
swer is probably uncorrelated, but coincidentally also happens to be no.
The three most important diﬀerences between Democrats and Republi-
cans are listed in table 3C.1, albeit in somewhat exaggerated and stylized
form.
The Geanakoplos-Zeldes plan would be most feasible in a world popu-
lated by stupid Republicans and smart Democrats. The stupid Republicans
would be so excited about something called “accounts” that they would
miss the fact that this plan does very little to achieve most of the goals Re-
publicans set for accounts. The smart Democrats would look past the op-
tics of the accounts to discover that the system preserves intergenerational
risk-sharing, a large forced savings component, and inﬂation-adjusted an-
nuities—plus restores balance by paying for the entire long-run shortfall in
Social Security through general revenues, ensuring both current beneﬁt
levels and a relatively progressive ﬁnancing system. Without commenting
on the two preconditions individually, I will just note I think it is unlikely
that both of them hold simultaneously.
Future Work
Although not likely to be on the agenda in the near future, the
Geanakoplos-Zeldes plan is an exciting analytic contribution. I look for-
ward to future research building on their framework. In particular, the
most intriguing suggestion in their chapter is a way to achieve robust
solvency by matching the beneﬁts incurred by workers in any given year
with the payroll taxes paid by those workers in that year. It would be inter-
esting to simulate this proposal and understand how it could be translated
back into the language of the deﬁned beneﬁt system as a step toward eval-
uating whether it should indeed be the basis of a Social Security reform.
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